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Ballot Measure

Resolution
Ballot Measure 26-28 :

Portland Parks Five -Year Levy
City Club Resolution “YES” on 26-28
"While there are many things, both small and great, which may
contribute to the beauty of a great city, unquestionably one of the
greatest is a comprehensive system of parks and parkways."
Olmsted Brothers, 1903 Report to the Portland Parks Board
WHEREAS, the Portland City Council has passed Ordinance
176201, referring A Five Year Levy To Restore Park Services, Repairs
And Recreation Programs , to the May 21, 2002 ballot as Ballot
Measure 26-28;
WHEREAS, the Measure will levy $.39 per $1,000 of assessed
valuation, to produce an estimated $48.4 million over 5 years,
averaging $9.7 million per year, and costing the average
homeowner $59.00 per year, or $5.00 per month;
WHEREAS, the levy funds from Ballot Measure 26-28 will be spent
on:
• Restoration of basic park maintenance programs including litter
removal, restroom cleaning and mowing;
• Correction of urgent safety problems with playground
equipment, play fields, community centers and pools;
• Repair of some playing fields around schools in the Centennial,
David Douglas, Reynolds, Parkrose and Portland Public School
Districts;
• Prevention of additional cuts to after-school tutoring, recreation
activities, and summer playground programs;
WHEREAS, in 1938, 1950, 1978, and 1994, the City Club of Portland
studied proposed park levies on the ballot in those years and
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recommended approval. In each case, the Club firmly supported the
measures;
WHEREAS; in 1994 the Club adopted a major study report entitled
Portland Metropolitan Area Parks . The report supported improving
maintenance, effecting deferred repairs, upgrading and adding
facilities, and restoring or expanding programs. Several of the major
recommendations in that report have been realized in the seven or
eight years since, in part because of the funds provided by the earlier
park levy;
WHEREAS; since 1997, budget constraints have again led to curtailed
programs, deferred maintenance of property and facilities, lowered
safety of playgrounds and equipment, and closure or curtailment of
open hours at certain facilities;
WHEREAS; there are common themes in the Club's earlier reports
which still hold true today:
• "Portland's parks are the jewels in the crown of our city and
represent one of the most favorable aspects of life in Portland.
Portland, however, lacks the capacity to meet the parks needs of its
existing and expanding population." ( Portland Metropolitan
Area Parks, September 1994, Section VI, Conclusions, p. 137.)
While this may be little less so now, the pressure of increasing
population and park use continues to tax the system.
• Proper physical maintenance of the parks, and of the buildings
and facilities that are contained within them, is an ongoing
necessity. However, budget pressures force deferred repairs,
curtailed maintenance programs, and decreases in the staff
needed to run programs.
• The programs conducted by the Portland Bureau of Parks and
Recreation in those facilities benefit all of our citizens; from elders
taking a quiet walk in Laurelhurst Park, to joggers and hikers in
Forest Park, to swimmers and basketball players who use the pools
and courts in the parks and community centers around the city.
• In particular, youth oriented programs run by Parks and
Recreation offer constructive, creative, and healthy outlets for
young minds and bodies, and offer safe, positive activities for their
time away from home and school.
• The collaboration between Parks and Recreation and the area's
public schools, which includes co-located facilities and Parks and
Recreation programs run in schools, has been positive and
beneficial to both agencies, and to the public they serve. This
collaboration should continue to be supported; and
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WHEREAS, although, City Club taxation studies have found that the
property tax is undesirably regressive and properties are now
inequitably assessed because of 1997 Measure 50, fundamental tax
reform is not being considered at this time, and no realistic
alternative exists to raise the revenue needed to support park and
recreation services in Portland;
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that, given the ongoing need to
maintain and improve Parks and Recreation facilities and programs
that well serve our community, and following City Club's support of
past levies to meet those needs, the City Club Board of Governors
publicly expresses the City Club's support for Measure 26-28 on the
May 21, 2002 ballot.
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Ballot Measure

Research Study
Ballot Measure 26-30 : Changes the City of
Portland’s Form of Government
Majority Recommends “YES” on 26-30
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Measure 26-30 would replace Portland's commission form
of government with a "strong mayor/city council" form—
seven of nine council members would be elected by
district.
The Majority of your Committee found that between 1961
and 1999, four City Club committees urged that Portland's
commission government be changed to a strong
mayor/council form. The City Council has tried for 15
years to patch over the deficiencies in the commission
form and to better coordinate the city's administrative
functions and bureau operations. These efforts have fallen
far short of what is needed. Portland's current city
government, as Mayor Katz correctly notes, remains
"Byzantine and dysfunctional." A "Yes" vote to change
Portland's form of government will remove the structural
barriers that increase costs of government and leave
citizens disenfranchised. If adopted, this measure will
unify executive responsibility under the mayor—resulting
in better value for our tax dollars; change the role of
council members to full-time legislators—which will
improve citizen representation and legislative
effectiveness; and make it less expensive to run for office
and diversify the potential candidate pool by electing
seven of the nine new Council members from districts
around the City. The Majority recommends a "Yes" vote
on Measure 26-30.

—Executive Summary continued on following page—
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The Minority of your committee believes that our city government
can improve. The most effective way to make improvements,
however, is to carefully examine the nature of the problems and
examine alternative solutions to those problems. No such process
has taken place. A change from the commission form of government
to a strong mayor form may be the wrong approach. Portland has
accomplished some remarkable things in the 40 years since the City
Club last examined Portland's of government and recommended a
change. Is it possible that Portland's many successes in those years
came about because of the form of government, rather than in spite
of it? That question needs to be answered before the current system
is changed. A Charter Review Commission or a "Blue Ribbon Panel"
could examine these issues and determine whether changes in the
charter, or other changes, are required. The adoption of Measure 2630, which was developed without widespread community input or
support, could result in significant disruption and lost opportunities
that, at this critical period in our community's history, cannot be
tolerated. The Minority recommends a "No" vote on Measure 26-30.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ballot Measure 26-30 will appear on the ballot as follows:
Caption:Amends Charter: Changes Form of City Government
Question:Shall Portland be governed by nine member Council
(seven elected by district) and managed by a Mayor
with veto authority?
Summary: This proposed measure changes the City's
government from the Commission form to
Mayor/ Council form with distinct and separate roles
for the Mayor versus Council members. Currently,
the executive and legislative branches of the City's
government are combined. The Mayor and each
Council member manage several departments and
vote on legislation. The measure gives the Mayor all
executive and administrative authority and the
Council all legislative and quasi-judicial authority.
The Mayor is not a Council Member, but has veto
power, subject to Council override by six affirmative
votes. The Council is increased to nine members; two
elected at large and seven elected from
geographically defined districts. Each Council
candidate must have resided in the district for one
year. The presiding officer is the President of the
Council. Each of the seven district Council members
will have an office within their district, and the two at
large Council members will have an office at City
Hall. Each council member is entitled to at least two
paid staff members. No cost estimate has been
provided.
(The language of the caption, question, and summary was prepared
by the Portland City Attorney.)
Ballot Measure 26-30 (hereinafter referred to as the Measure)
proposes replacing Portland's 89-year-old commission form of
government with a strong mayor/ council form of government widely
used throughout the United States. The City Club Board of Governors
created our study committee to review the Measure and help Club
members and the public better understand the implications of the
changes proposed.
A wide range of Club members comprised our committee, including
one member who had served on 1961 City Club committee that
9
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studied Portland's form of government. The City Club screened
committee members to ensure that no member had an economic
interest in the outcome of the study or had taken a public position
on the subject of the Measure (other than as a member of the
previous City Club study committee).
Committee members met from January through April 2002.
Committee members interviewed proponents and opponents of the
Measure, neighborhood and business representatives, and current
and former City officials. We reviewed relevant articles, video and
written presentations and testimony, past City Club reports and a
range of other materials.
A. Report Structure
The report begins by describing Portland's commission form of
government, other major forms of government, past attempts to
change Portland's government, and prior City Club positions on the
issue. The report continues with statements by proponents and
opponents of the Measure and an analysis of key issues. The research
committee is divided over the benefits and drawbacks of Measure 2630, and thus conclusions and recommendations from both the
committee majority and minority appear at the end of the report.
B. Major Elements of Measure 26-30
Measure 26-30
was placed on the May 21, 2002 ballot by citizen
1
initiative . The chief petitioner is Robert Ball. The Measure proposes
to change Portland's commission form of government to a
mayor/ council form of government. (See Appendix D. )
Under Portland's current commission form of government, the City
Council (the mayor and four commissioners, all elected at-large) acts
as the legislative body. Individual council members also exercise
executive administrative control over the city bureaus and offices
assigned to them by the mayor. The Measure would replace the
commission form of government and make the following changes:

1. Proposed changes to the form of government
E

The mayor exercises sole executive authority over all city bureaus
and offices.

1 City Code sets the signature requirement for initiative petitions at 15 percent of the
highest number of votes tallied for any one City Office at the last preceding City General
Election. Until November 2002, this number is 26,095 (15 percent of the votes tallied for
Mayor in November 2000). According to the City Auditor, based on a statistically valid
sample of the signatures submitted by Robert Ball, the petition contained approximately
32,712 valid signatures.
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• A nine-member city council exercises legislative and quasi-judicial
authority.
• The mayor is not a member of city council.
• The mayor has veto-power over ordinances passed by the City
Council. The Council may override the mayor's veto with six of
nine votes.
• The mayor proposes a city budget and submits the budget to the
City Council. The Council approves or amends the budget. The
council may not override the mayor's veto of ordinances adopting
or amending the City budget.
• Five city departments are created corresponding to the titles of the
five departments established by the 1913 city charter 2 . City
bureaus and offices are grouped under these departments.
Additional departments may be created by ordinance.
• The mayor appoints, manages, and removes the director of each of
the five departments, and the directors of all city bureaus and
offices. The mayor authorizes the hiring and removal of all other
city department, bureau, and office employees, subject to civil
service rules.
• The mayor appoints all persons who serve on city boards and
commissions, subject to council confirmation. Once appointed,
the mayor may remove any of these persons, at any time.
• City council members are elected as follows: two elected at-large
and seven elected by geographic districts.
• The two at-large council members have offices in City Hall. The
district council members have offices in their respective districts.
District council members will have access to meeting rooms and
shared office space at City Hall.
• Each council member can hire two full-time staff at City expense.
• The city council would fill by appointment any vacancies in the
positions of mayor, city auditor, or any city council seat.

2. Transition to New Form
• November 2002: The two city council members elected at the
2
The 1913 city charter created five departments: Department of Public Affairs,
Department of Finance, Department of Public Safety, Department of Public Works, and
Department of Public Utilities, with the mayor and each commissioner identified as
head of one of those departments. These departments are not recognized under current
city government operations. Instead, the day-to-day operations of the city are carried out
by its several bureaus. (See Appendix C for current bureau assignments.)
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November 2002 election serve as the at-large council members,
beginning on January 1, 2003.
• January 2004: The city council establishes seven geographic city
council districts by Jan. 1, 2004. Each district is approximately
equal in population based on the U.S. decennial census.
• November 2004: The mayor elected in November 2004 serves as
the first "strong mayor" starting January 1, 2005. The seven district
city council members elected in November 2004 serve starting
January 1, 2005.
• Effective Date: Although the text of Measure 26-30 indicates that
the strong mayor and district council members would be elected
in 2004 and begin serving on January 1, 2005, the final sentence in
the measure reads: "Effective Date: This Amended and Restated
Charter shall be effective January 1, 2004." This would leave the
city council without a quorum to conduct business for one year
until the seven district council members would begin to serve on
January 1, 2005.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Common Types of City Governments
Cities in the United States generally adhere to one of three forms of
government: the strong mayor/city council form, the city
manager/city council form, and the commission form. Of the U.S.
cities over 100,000 population, the majority (60 percent) have a manager/council form of government; 36 percent have strong mayor/city
council governments; two percent have commission governments;
and two percent use other forms of government. (The "advantages"
and "disadvantages" of these forms of government are all directly
quoted from "Contemporary choices for citizens" by Julianne
Duvall.)

1. Strong Mayor/City Council
Under the strong mayor form, an elected mayor is the chief executive
officer. Legislative functions are vested in the city council. This
structure separates the administrative responsibilities from broad
legislative policy making. Mayors are elected at large, have the power
to appoint and remove department heads, are responsible for the
preparation of the budget for council consideration, and have veto
power. The mayor is also the chief administrative officer for the city.
A number of cities with this form of government have a chief
administrative officer who has professional training similar to a city
manager. This administrative officer is appointed by and is directly
responsible to the mayor for managing daily administrative
functions.
Perceived advantages:
• Strong leadership with centralized responsibility.
• Facilitates policy formulation and implementation.
Perceived disadvantages:
• Too much responsibility for one person.
• Mayor may not be a professional administrator.

2. City Manager/Council
Under this form of government, the city council hires a professional
city manager who reports directly to the council. Although the
13
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council retains both legislative and administrative powers, it
delegates the day-to-day administrative functions to the city
manager. Thus, the city manager serves as the professional executive
in charge of municipal affairs, but reports to and is subject to
dismissal by the council.
In this form of government the mayor may be elected by the city at
large or by the council. The mayor's responsibilities are largely
ceremonial with no appointive or administrative power.
Perceived advantages:
• Professional manager in charge of managing city.
• Council retains policy control.
• City run in business-like manner.
Perceived disadvantages:
• No strong, effective political leadership.
• Tendency for manager to usurp policy functions.
• Manager may be a stranger to the city, seeking only to advance
his/her career.

3. Commission
The commission form of government combines legislative and
administrative responsibilities in a group of elected commissioners
(commonly three, five, or seven). The mayor may be elected
separately or chosen from the group of elected commissioners, and
may have some unique powers and responsibilities, but generally is a
coequal member of the commission. Commissioners have both
legislative and executive responsibilities. As a group commissioners
and mayor make city policy, enact city ordinances, and appropriate
city funds. Individually they administer city bureaus.
Perceived advantages:
• Has worked well in emergency situations.
• Simple organizational structure.
• Swift direct implementation of policy.
Perceived disadvantages:
• Legislative and policy functions held by one body.
14
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• No checks and balances.
• No one person with overall administrative responsibility.
• Difficult to elect legislators with administrative abilities.
B. Portland's City Government: The Commission Form
Under Portland's charter, the city is governed by a commission made
up of the mayor and four full-time commissioners, all elected atlarge in non-partisan elections. As a typical commission form,
Portland's government does not separate the executive from the
legislative functions. The mayor and the four commissioners serve as
the legislative body, developing policy, setting the city's budget, and
passing ordinances. All five members of the commission serve as
executive heads of the various city bureaus. Council members also
act in a quasi-judicial capacity when hearing land-use and other
types of appeals.
In addition to the mayor and four commissioners, Portland elects a
City Auditor to conduct financial and performance audits of city
government. Each of the six elected positions holds a four-year term,
with elections staggered to avoid a complete turnover of the council.
The mayor and two commissioners are elected in one year, the
auditor and the other two commissioners in another year. The mayor
and four commissioners are generally equal in rank and power. Each
has only one vote. The mayor exercises a few additional powers,
including the assignment (and reassignment) of the bureaus to
individual commissioners, chairing the city council meetings, and
preparing a proposed unified budget for consideration by the full
commission.
The mayor and commissioners hire professional managers to run the
day-to-day operations of the bureaus. The mayor and individual
commissioners have the authority to hire and fire the directors and
staff of the bureaus assigned to them (subject to civil service rules).
C. History of Portland's Form of Government Locally and
Nationally
Portland adopted the commission form of government in 1913,
following a nationwide reform movement. Before the reform
movement swept the country, most cities were governed by strongmayor/city ward systems with district- elected council members. City
governments throughout the country changed from this form of
government and moved to the commission form because of
problems with corruption and inefficiency that in some cases
created civic paralysis. One of the hallmarks of the commission form
15
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of government that led to its wide use is its populist element of
initiatives, referenda, and voter-recall provisions. The commission
form spread rapidly and by 1917 it had been adopted by 500 cities.
Thereafter, its use declined and most cities abandoned the
commission form and moved to a mayor/ council form or to a city
manager/council form. Today, Portland is the only city in the U.S.
with a population greater than 125,000 that still uses the commission
form of government3 .
Since approving the commission form of government in 1913,
Portland has voted on its city government five times 4 , and retained
the commission form each time.
D. City Club Positions on Portland's Form of Government
1933 and 1958—Recommended City Manager: In 1933, the City Club
issued a report on the Portland's commission government that raised
many of the same concerns raised today and that recommended
adoption of the council/manager form of government. However, that
proposal did not reach the ballot until placed there by initiative
petition in 1958. City Club supported the measure; voters rejected it
53 percent to 47 percent.
1960s—Recommended Strong Mayor: After the 1958 vote, and
because the City Club had not studied the matter since 1933, the City
Club appointed a new committee, chaired by a former City Club
President, Francis Stayton, with the following charge:
Should the form of Portland's city government be
changed? The study should include an appraisal of the
present form of city government and its effectiveness.
It should also include a summary of arguments for and
against changing it and advance some alternatives.
On May 19, 1961, after over a year of study, the committee published
a 45-page report (Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 51) that analyzed the various
forms of city government. The report concluded:
The central weakness in the Portland City government
stems from the diffusion of the management job
3
According to the National League of Cities, in early 2002, two U.S. counties with
populations larger than Portland continue to use the commission form of government:
Broward County, FL (Miami area) population 1.6 million; and Pinellas County, FL
(Tampa area) population 728,000.
4

1917 voters reject two measures to repeal commission form by 2 to 1
1926 and 1927 voters approve simplification and retention of commission forms
1958 voters reject measure to change city manager/council form (61,821 to 55, 283)
1966 voters reject change to strong mayor/council form (68,158 to 41,848)
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among five co-equal commissioner-administrators who,
at the same time, collectively make up the legislative
body or city council. The legislative function, in turn, is
weakened by the confusion of the desirable over-all
policy viewpoint with particular administrative
responsibilities and interests.
The study committee members unanimously recommended that
Portland adopt a strong mayor/ council form of government with a
city council of eight members elected city-wide. They recommended
a strong mayor—over the Club's previous position favoring a city
manager—because "the lack of an elected chief executive
responsible for legislative leadership, external relations, and general
management of the city government makes the form not well suited
to a large city such as Portland. "The report was overwhelmingly
adopted by the City Club membership.
Following the Club's adoption of the 1961 report, a sub-committee
was charged with drafting a proposed new City Charter, based on the
report recommendations, to effect the change to a council/strong
mayor form. That subcommittee proposed a charter revision for the
City of Portland, which was published in the City Club Bulletin on
July 5, 1963 and approved by the Club membership. Thereafter, a
coalition (known as the "Committee for Effective City
Government"—which included the Young Republicans and Young
Democrats of Portland, the Portland League of Women Voters, and
the Junior Chamber of Commerce) obtained the necessary signatures
to put the measure on the May 1966 primary ballot. On May 13, 1966
the membership of the City Club voted 8 to 1 in support of the
Measure. The citizens of Portland, however, defeated the measure by
nearly two to one.
1999—Further Criticism of Commission Form: The City Club's most
recent comments on Portland's form of government appeared in
1999, in the Club's report: Increasing Density in Portland. While the
report was primarily intended as a review of the City's planning
policies, the report did state that "our research confirms that the
commission form inhibits more coordinated and effective
management of our city." The report concluded that the mayor and
city council had not articulated a clear vision for how Portland
should grow, responsibility over planning and development was
fragmented among a number of bureaus and commissioners,
planning efforts were not well coordinated across city bureaus, the
city council lacked a disciplined approach by which to prioritize
proposed projects, and the city council assigned new planning and
development related projects to bureaus without considering the
impact on staff resources and overall city priorities.
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III. PROPONENT AND OPPONENT ASSERTIONS
A. Assertions Made by Proponents of Measure 26-30

Portland has outgrown its antiquated commission form of
government. All other major cities in the U.S. abandoned this form of
government years ago. Portland needs a government that is able to
meet the complex challenges of the future.
No one is in charge. Portland is now governed collectively by "five
mayors." No one person has the authority to set a direction and
require city bureaus to work together to achieve objectives and goals.
Turf battles between bureaus and commissioners significantly
reduce coordination and efficiency.
The city needs professional management. City commissioners directly administer city bureaus, but often have little management experience or experience with the work of their bureaus.
The city needs better oversight of city operations. Commissioners
generally avoid criticizing departments, operations, or policies of
other commissioners' bureaus because they fear that other
commissioners will retaliate by criticizing their bureaus.
The city needs better effective long-range and capital planning.
Projects and budget decisions are often driven more by the particular
interests of individual commissioners than a rational assessment of
the city's needs.
Citizens are not well represented in Portland. Racial, ethnic, and cultural groups in Portland are not well-represented or heard in city
government.
Neighborhoods cannot get the city council to discuss and respond to
their concerns. No commissioner has ever been elected from North
Portland or Outer Southeast Portland.
City commissioners and the mayor are out of touch with citizen and
neighborhood needs. They focus more on running their bureaus than
getting out into the community.
The high cost of citywide council elections prevents many qualified
and talented people from running for office. Citywide elections also
prevent a diversity of voices and points of view.
Citizens have poor access to government. The "dense" structure of
commissions, boards, associations, offices, and government
18
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employees inhibit citizens' access to elected officials.

A strong mayor/council form of government will be more fiscally efficient. Current overlapping services and lack of adequate long-range
planning cause inefficiencies that have a high cost to the city and
tax-payers.
City council members will be able to devote 100 percent of their time
to legislation. Nine council members—seven elected by district—
with no executive responsibilities will spend more time planning and
discussing important city legislation.
The citizen initiative process is a legitimate government process, and
perhaps the only way the form of government will be changed.
Executive and administrative functions will be unified under the
mayor. City government will run more smoothly, coordination and
communication will be improved, and processes will be streamlined.
Professional managers—not elected officials—will administer five
departments of city government. City bureaus with similar missions
or characteristics will be grouped together and administered in a
rational way.
City council people elected by district will listen and respond to
citizens and more effectively oversee government operations. The
small size of the seven districts will reduce the cost of elections and
enable more good people to run for council seats.
City council members will help citizens gain better access and
service from city government.
B. Assertions Made by Opponents of Measure 26-30

Portland is a great and successful city—whatever problems exist do
not justify a drastic change in Portland's government. Portland is
consistently ranked as one of the most livable and best-managed
cities in the nation. Portland is known across the nation for its many
model projects, programs, and policies.
Measure 26-30 is poorly written and full of administrative flaws. If
passed, the Measure will require immediate amendment to avoid an
inadvertent year-long government shutdown. Unclear language in
the Measure raises many other questions.
Measure 26-30 concentrates too much power in the mayor. The
proposed council is so weak that citizens, acting through their
council members, would have far less power than they do now. Today
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the city council and mayor form a partnership that benefits every
citizen. No single elected official has too much power—it is a system
with shared power and responsibilities, and built-in checks and
balances. Under a strong mayor, one bad mayor could do a lot of
damage.

Portland's commission form of government encourages innovation.
Commissioners have the ability—through executive control of their
bureaus—to take the lead and develop innovative projects and
programs (e.g. Portland Streetcar, Green Building Initiative, the
Performing Arts Center, the Chinese Garden, Waterfront Park,
Pioneer Courthouse Square, Salmon Creek Fountain and the
Eastbank Esplanade). Under a strong mayor, only programs of
interest to the mayor would be pursued.
The city council has already instituted a number of changes to
improve coordination and efficiency in Portland's government.
Many administrative functions, including personnel, purchasing,
and information technology, are now being coordinated and
centralized by the Chief Administrative Officer, a recently-created
position that serves at the pleasure of and reports to the full City
Council.
The strong mayor form of government will not guarantee better
coordination or efficiency. Many cities with strong mayor systems,
such as Seattle, have significant coordination and efficiency
problems.
The city bureaus are already under the professional management of
appointed bureau heads. Bureau heads are widely considered the
most qualified and professional people for the jobs they hold.
A strong mayor system will insulate city bureaus from citizens,
increase the layers of bureaucracy, and reduce the openness and
accessibility of government in Portland. Citizens and community
groups have good access to City Hall now.
Electing council members by district will lead to parochialism, ward
politics, political divisiveness, conflict with the mayor, and an
inability to move forward on citywide issues.
District city council elections will decrease—not increase—effective
representation in Portland. All five city council members now have
an incentive to listen to and act on behalf of individual citizens and
neighborhood groups. Under a district-elected government, citizens
will lose their present access to all commissioners and the responsiveness of the system. Without executive powers, a district council
member can listen, but won't have any ability to do anything.
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The mayor/council form of government will increase the
representation given to monied interests. Those with the financial
interest to do so will find it easier to curry the favors of one strong
mayor than the three commissioners needed to move an issue under
the current system.
Few good people will want to run for a city council that has little
power to act. Citywide elections attract high quality candidates—
district elections will not.
Portland's commissioners are directly accountable. If you have a
problem with a city service you know which commissioner to go to.
Commissioners have the power (and political incentive) to do
something about it. Under a strong mayor, accountability will
erode—one person cannot realistically be accountable and
responsive for every city bureau and office.
The cost of government will increase under Measure 26-30. The
Measure adds at least two layers of management, doubles the
number of full-time paid politicians, and substantially increases the
city council budget. No fiscal analysis has been done of the likely
impacts of the Measure.
Not enough legislative work exists for nine full-time council
members. The five current commissioners spend only part of their
time on legislative matters.
Measure 26-30 was developed in isolation with no public input. It is
only one person's idea of what needs to happen. Fundamental
changes to Portland's form of government should only happen after
an open and public process where the problems are identified and
the solutions are proposed. Portland has a wealth of well-informed
and committed citizens whose collective wisdom should be tapped
to address this issue.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The primary question before the voters, as well as before City Club
members, is whether adoption of a strong mayor/council form of
government as proposed by Measure 26-30 will provide Portland
with more effective and representative government than does the
present commission form. In answering that question, your
Committee examined three subsidiary questions: (1) Are there
critical problems with the functioning of the city government?
(2) Does the current form of Portland's government cause those
problems? and (3) Does Measure 26-30 propose a form of
government that will solve those problems? We analyzed the
proposed measure, and we also took a hard look at how a change in
the form of government might affect Portland. We construct the
discussion section around these three questions.
5

Nearly two-dozen witnesses testified to your Committee members
in support of and opposition to the Measure. In addition to
interviews, Committee members also reviewed written background
materials, including historic perspectives, current news and feature
articles, reports of other civic organizations, statistical material and
statutory provisions. These written sources informed our
understanding of the Measure before us, as well as our
comprehension of the structure and function of city government in
Portland and elsewhere.
In the following discussion section, different perspectives on key
issues related to the Measure and Portland's form of government are
presented, along with background information gathered from
secondary sources.
A. Are there critical problems with the functioning of the city
government?
Portland is internationally recognized as a vital, highly livable city.
The city's urban planning is revered throughout the nation and is
often credited with fostering Portland's active business community,
growing cultural life, innovative parks and diverse transportation
options. Portland is ranked third nationally—only behind New York
City and San Francisco—in downtown retail sales. The
City Auditor's
6
annual Service Efforts and Accomplishments Report found that
citizen satisfaction is increasing and documented the many people
who continue to move here, choosing Portland as home. Portland
city government has been independently rated as the third best
5 See Appendix A for a complete list of witnesses.
6 See www.ci.portland.or.us/auditor/audser/htm/summary280.htm
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operating city in the country.
Robert Ball, chief petitioner for Measure 26-30, believes that even if
the city is currently functioning in a reasonable manner, the
commission form is inadequate to meet the increasingly complex
challenges on Portland's horizon. Ball and others claim that now is
the time to look at a new form of government—not when the city is
in the midst of a crisis. He believes that the city is facing major
changes in the future, as the population increases and urban issues
become increasingly complex, and that the strong mayor/council
form of government will better allow Portland to respond to those
changes.
A number of the people we talked to criticized Portland's city
government as inefficient, not responsive to citizens, and poorly
managed. While many believe that the City's motto—"The City That
Works"—is indicative of Portland's unique involved citizenry and
proactive city government officials, several witnesses pointed to two
recent events as examples of things that have not worked in
Portland.
Water Bureau Billing System: In 1997, the Water Bureau contracted
with a Houston firm to develop a new computer billing system. The
Bureau activated the new $6.6 million system in February 2000.
Extensive technical problems resulted, which prevented the bureau
from sending out over 40,000 water and sewer bills. As a result, the
City of Portland may lose $10 to $15 million in revenue because of
bills that are uncollectable. Measure proponents cite the problems
with the computer system as evidence of the need for a strong mayor
form of government. Your committee heard the following
perspectives on the causes and lessons offered by the problems.
Steve Bauer (former director, Portland Office of Finance and
Administration, 1986 to 1995) told your Committee that, in the 1990s,
Portland's Office of Finance and Administration (OFA) reviewed the
Water Bureau's proposal for a new computer billing system. He said
the Water Bureau's computer system had evolved over time, and
bureau staff had not documented all the changes to the system.
OFA's computer system analyst determined that the Water Bureau's
needs could be met through changes to the existing system. Bauer
said OFA had strong concerns about the proposed project and went
to the mat to urge then Water Bureau Commissioner Mike Lindberg
not proceed with the project. Bauer said Water Bureau staff pushed
hard on their commissioner to approve the project. Lindberg decided
to go ahead with the project. Bauer said Lindberg had no independent analysis with which to make his decision. The Bureau's own
analysis was biased in favor of the new system. Bauer characterized
this as a classic case of the bureau turf system in Portland—when
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someone asks tough questions about a bureau's plans or operations,
bureau staff run to their commissioner to protect them. The city's
current Chief Administrative Officer Tim Grewe told your Committee
that the City's existing Bureau of Information Technology (BIT) was
not included in the planning process for the new computer system.
The City Council subsequently centralized all city bureau computer
operations under BIT. BIT currently is overseeing the efforts to
correct the problems with the Water Bureau's troubled computer
system.
City Auditor Gary Blackmer observed that problems happen all the
time with projects to design complex new computer systems.
Computer systems projects have failed under all types of governing
structures, including a strong unified executive. Blackmer said the
computer system design company offered the Water Bureau a
significant discount for a state-of-the-art, custom-designed system.
The company planned to use the completed system to market the
company's services to other cities.
Commissioner Erik Sten (current city commissioner overseeing the
Water Bureau) told your committee that this was a purchasing
decision, and that the computer system company misled the bureau.
He said the system was turned on too early in the process, which was
a mistake. Sten said he was not made aware of concerns within the
Water Bureau about the timing of the activation. Sten noted that one
key lesson learned is to always keep an existing billing system
running until the bugs are worked out of the new system. Sten
suggested that, under a strong mayor system, the problem might not
have surfaced. The mayor might have fired a couple of people. Sten
said he resisted political pressure to scrap the system after the
problems surfaced. He chose instead to stick with it and get it to
work. Scrapping the existing system and creating a new one could
cost an additional $15 million.
Would a strong mayor form of government have prevented the
problems with the Water Bureau computer system? Some people
argue that, under a strong mayor government, the proposal would
have received more independent and experienced analysis and
oversight. Others question whether the form of government is
responsible, and suggest that the problem may be more the result of
activating the new system too soon and not keeping the old system
running in parallel until problems had been solved.
Columbia Sportswear: In 2001, Columbia Sportswear moved its
long-time headquarters from North Portland to Washington County.
Before deciding to leave Portland, company leaders first attempted
to locate their new expanded headquarters elsewhere within the city.
The committee learned about this issue primarily from Measure
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proponent Pete Mark and an extensive article in Brainstorm
Magazine ("The City That Shrinks," March 2002). The article quotes
company leaders and other business representatives who attribute
Portland's loss of this very successful and growing local company
(1,600 employees and $800 million in annual revenue) to a lack of
flexibility in the city's planning and development review process and
a lack of active support from Mayor Katz.
The article says that the mayor should have been aware of the
opportunity to keep Columbia Sportswear in Portland and should
have assigned an advocate for the company to participate in the
meetings with development review staff. They blame the company's
move on a difficult development approval process, a lack of
leadership from the mayor to assist the company through the
process. In response to the problems with the development review
process, the article quotes Mayor Katz as saying, "That's Charlie's
[Hales] department .... I told you before that this form of government
is dysfunctional."
Some business leaders complained, in the article, that Portland is
unfriendly to business, that city government is too process- and
planning-driven, that the mayor and council members lack vision
and leadership, and pursue utopian goals. One individual quoted in
the article noted the ability of former Portland Mayors Goldschmidt
and Ivancie to get things done.
Would a strong mayor form of government have prevented the loss of
Columbia Sportswear? The Brainstorm article argues that a strong
mayor could have prevented the loss of Columbia Sportswear. Others
question whether the form of government is responsible, and suggest
that the conflict may be more about a disagreement with the
priorities and goals of the current mayor and council, or problems
with the management and operation of the office of Planning and
Development Review (OPDR). Your Committee did not have time for
a more in-depth review of this case.
B. Does the current form of Portland's government cause those
problems?
This section presents the information and arguments about the
changes in the form of government proposed by the Measure, and
the subsequent impacts these changes may have on legislative
efficacy, representation, executive efficacy, management of city
services, government oversight, and city finances.
The government of any city includes both legislative and executive
functions. As shown by the three common forms of city government
discussed above, the relationship between the individuals vested
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with legislative and executive duties differs from city to city. Under
most forms of government employed in the United States, a system
of public scrutiny and evaluation prevents serious abuse or neglect
of the core functions and powers of representative government.
1. Legislative Duties and Responsibilities
The legislative duties and responsibilities of a city government
include policy-making and oversight of the budget and executive
operations. Additionally, legislators must communicate effectively
with the executive officer(s) of the city to ensure that long-range
planning is executed in conjunction with the will of the people. It is
also the responsibility of the legislative officer(s) to understand
executive functions in order to frame reasonable legislation and
ensure that legislative policy is in fact carried out.
If approved, the Measure will create nine full-time city legislators.
Portland City Council members would no longer have executive
responsibilities. Council members would focus on policymaking,
strategic planning, oversight of the executive, and representation of
constituents. Proponents of changing the form of government
suggest that investigating and deliberating over policies is a job too
large for the current five commissioners who spend most of their
time performing their executive duties for the bureaus and,
according to some, a third of their time on legislative matters.
Measure proponents say that a body of nine council members will be
able to create dialogue in the city on major policy issues and engage
in long range planning and thinking.
Measure opponents are not convinced that Portland needs nine fulltime politicians. Portland City Commissioner Charlie Hales argues
that paying nine full-time city councilors will leave them with too
much time to create political drama and jockey for power. He said
that current commissioners spend only about 15 percent of their
time on legislation. Opponents of the Measure believe that
increasing the number of legislative actors in the government will
not resolve Portland's need for better long-term planning and
coordination of services.
What do members of a full-time, legislative city council do with their
time? Your committee looked to Seattle—a city with a council/strong
mayor system of nine at-large council members—to find out. Bruce
Brooks (Deputy Mayor under Seattle Mayor Norm Rice, 1995 through
1997) told your Committee that Seattle city council members have
"sufficient work to keep the councilmen busy full time." Brooks
pointed out that the Seattle Council created a committee to deal with
long-range capital planning in 1994. Former Portland OFA Director
Steve Bauer (who subsequently served as city manager of Bellevue,
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Washington from 1995-1997) noted that the Seattle City Council
focuses on policy review and legislation. Bauer and others told your
Committee that, if voters create a new city council in Portland,
council members would need to hire professional policy and budget
analysis staff (beyond the two staff per council member provided in
the Measure) to allow the council to effectively develop, review and
assess policy and budget proposals.
Efficacy of Legislative Branch

Turf battles vs. efficiency. Does Portland's current form of
government lead to significant inefficiencies? Some witnesses said
that poor coordination between bureaus and duplication of services
cause great losses of efficiency. Others said efficiency in Portland's
government is about as good or better than in other cities—some
noted that, in the 1990s, Portland was rated as one of the best
managed cities in the country. Most of the individuals we spoke with
agreed that some inefficiencies exist. Over the past 15 years, the City
Council has instituted changes in an attempt to improve interbureau coordination and reduce duplication and inconsistencies in
administrative services across all city bureaus.
Some witnesses believe that only a major overhaul of Portland's
government will achieve significant improvement in efficiency. These
individuals would prefer to see a chief executive officer leading the
city, providing centralization of political, managerial and
administrative leadership. Furthermore, these individuals believe the
disadvantages of the commission form of government are
insurmountable as the city moves toward addressing its concerns.
Under the Commission form, they point out, there are duplicate
functions handled separately in each of the Bureaus, such as
personnel, public relations and procurement, resulting in differing
policies from bureau to bureau. Under a strong mayor system, those
functions would be uniform and coordinated.
Others believe that the slow process of change currently underway
promises to deliver a more unified administration and management
of the city without abandoning the commission form of government.
Other individuals say that the unity of the city council needed to
achieve major changes under the commission form with erode as
changes begin to erode bureau turf.
Oversight, Evaluation, and Review

Effective Oversight. The committee heard from many people that city
commissioners avoid looking too closely at or criticizing the
operations of each others bureaus. Some say that city
commissioners, who serve as the executive heads of individual city
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bureaus, cannot exercise independent oversight of their own
bureaus. Some Measure opponents say that, with their executive
authority and close contact with day-to-day bureau operations,
commissioners can provide very close oversight over their own
bureaus. Measure proponents say that the proposed nine-member
legislative city council would provide much more independent and
effective oversight than the current commissioners in their dual
executive/legislative role.
Commissioner Erik Sten explained that "an independent review
never seems to happen" under the current system. Don McClave of
the Portland Chamber of Commerce agrees and told us that the custom of the commission form of government is for each commissioner to defer bureau review to the commissioner running that bureau.
According to Sten, the current system works well if you have a good
bureau director paired with a "brainy" Commissioner. He believes
the system's dependence on having good people in both roles is a
weakness.
Some say this lack of independent oversight under the current
system is somewhat offset by the relatively strong role of the elected
city auditor. The auditor can conduct independent investigations
and performance audits of all city bureaus. However, the city auditor
only has enough staff to perform a limited number of audits each
year. The auditor usually schedules audits a year in advance and
chooses the subjects of the audits with input from City Council
members and affected parties. The auditor does not track and
evaluate ongoing operations and policies of all city bureaus.
The Measure would give the mayor executive responsibility for all
city bureaus. Some opponents of the Measure worry that one
individual cannot exercise oversight over all of the city's many
complex bureaus and operations. Many opponents worry that
effective oversight would diminish dramatically. Measure proponents
say that a strong mayor would have more incentive to make city
government work well as a whole rather than favoring any particular
bureau.

Access to Government and Accountability. Aside from the
government's internal evaluation, there is debate about whether or
not the proposed changes would make city government more or less
accountable and responsive to the public. Opponents charge that the
Measure would create a more insulated government with more layers
of bureaucracy. Proponents believe that seven district-elected
council members will necessarily become more highly involved in
their districts. They say council members will have the stature and
visibility to help citizens get the information and services they
need-similar to the constituent services provided by state legislators
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regarding state agencies and congressional representatives regarding
federal agencies.
Opponents of the Measure, such as former Portland City Auditor
Jewel Lansing, predict a loss of openness and collaboration with the
institution of strong mayor. Witnesses pointed out that a unified
command structure is no guarantee of efficiency. Several witnesses
thought that the proposed form would result in a less open,
accessible administration.
The city auditor currently plays a significant role in enhancing the
openness of the government process. The auditor ensures that the
citizens have access to council agenda, legislation, and records, and
plays an increasing role in investigating citizen complaints through
the new Office of the Ombudsman and the new Independent Police
Review Division in the auditor's office.
Blackmer suggested that if the city council becomes a solely
legislative body, the city auditor should report to the city council, not
the mayor. This would give the auditor greater independence from
the executive branch, which controls the city operations being
audited. Blackmer said the establishment of this type of
independence is a goal of the National Association of Local
Government Auditors. Blackmer said it is difficult to find experienced
auditors (inherently a conservative profession) who are willing to run
for office (an inherently uncertain and unpredictable process). He
suggested that, if voters approve the Measure, the city charter should
be changed to allow the city council to appoint the city auditor.

2. Effective and Diverse Political Representation
It is extremely important to an involved citizenry such as Portland's
to have clear access to effective representation. Furthermore, people
must perceive that such access makes a difference. It does no good to
have access to a representative if that representative has no power. It
does no good to have a powerful representative if that person is
remote from the voters.
Measure proponents say that many segments and areas of our
community are not well represented under Portland's current form
of government. They believe that council members elected by district
would have a strong opportunity and incentive to listen to their
constituents. Opponents say that Portlanders have unusually easy
access to city commissioners and that city commissioners have the
executive power to respond to citizen needs unlike a purely
legislative council member. The say that district election of council
members would give people the "illusion" of representation but have
little ability to get city government to respond to their concerns.
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Current commissioners spend a significant amount of their time
administering their bureaus—this is time that they do not have
available to spend on "legislative" matters (i.e. meeting with
constituents, addressing individual constituent needs by walking
them through the system to the individual who can help, and
communicating constituent needs back to the full council).
Proponents of the Measure believe that an increase in the number of
council members and district elections (for seven of the nine council
members) will improve representation, provide easier access to city
government, and diversify representation. Ball explains that the
proposed districts—consisting of approximately 75,000 people
each—are designed to be large enough to avoid parochialism but
small enough so as to still be "manageable."
Proponents say that—while there is no question that influential
people can and do gain access to the mayor and the commissioners
in Portland—many less well-connected citizens feel no ability to
have direct access to "their" representatives. Mayor Katz
acknowledged that commissioners are not able to spend as much
time in neighborhoods they should and are often unfamiliar with the
problems of particular neighborhoods or the views of many citizens.
The mayor told your Committee that she created the ombudsman
position in her office (in 1993), to help citizens who were not getting
adequate response from individual city bureaus. 7
Measure proponents also say that districting will provide
representation to areas of the city not currently represented.
According to proponents, council members whose functions are
limited to representation and legislation will provide better access to
the average citizen than does the current commission form. They
suggest that district elections would increase the ethnic diversity on
the city council. Furthermore, they point out that more people will
be able to afford and conduct a low-cost door-to-door campaign in a
district of 75,000 voters, than can mount a costly citywide campaign.
Opponents of the Measure believe that these changes will not have
desired effect. While each citizen would have one council member
elected from their district who would be motivated to listen to their
needs and represent them to the council, opponents believe this may
actually limit a citizen's access to city government. Former Mayor
7 The 2001 Ombudsman Report, notes that "while the Mayor's ombudsman served useful service by addressing the public's concerns and opinions, the work was more closely
related to constituent services than to ombudsman investigations." In 2000, City Auditor
Gary Blackmer proposed the creation of a more independent ombudsman to "provide
citizens a more neutral path to have their complaints addressed, particularly when existing avenues fail to resolve their concerns." In July 200 1, the City Council approved the
creation of the Office of the Ombudsman within the City Auditor's Office.
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Bud Clark asserts "[The Measure] pretends to offer more neighborhood representation by adding new city commissioners, but it strips
those positions of any power to get things done." In addition, opponents say that only three of the nine council members would have
any incentive to listen to any particular constituent (the member
from that district and the two at-large members).
Neighborhood activists are divided on the matter. Chris Smith, a
board member of the Northwest Neighborhood Association, believes
his representation would decrease under the Measure. "I am able to
get a hearing with every Council member right now; under the
proposed form of government, at least six members would have no
reason to give me an appointment," Smith said.
Dave Redlich, president of the Homestead Neighborhood
Association, believes that the commissioners are "captive to the
agenda of their bureaus" and that this "inhibits free discussion of city
policy." He said the Measure would provide an opportunity for
council members to raise issues important to neighborhoods across
the city. He also believes that the role and effectiveness of
neighborhood associations would be strengthened through
cooperation with their district council person.
Commissioner Hales believes district representation is a potential
hazard. "Under the current system a commissioner can afford to
have a couple of neighborhoods mad at him and still survive
politically," said Hales. He points out that he would likely have been
recalled over the controversy involving the siting of the new
community center in Gabriel Park if he had been elected only from
that district. He noted that the community center is now very
popular. Hales said that citywide elections free commissioners to "do
the right thing."
Furthermore, opponents of the Measure say that, under the current
system, commissioners have come from most parts of the city except
the area east of 82nd Avenue (annexed in the 1980s). Portland's
minority communities are not—for the most part—geographically
concentrated in such a way that districting would enable members of
these communities to vote as a block in any one district.
Furthermore, Portland's City Council and other political bodies over
time have been remarkably representative of the racial and ethnic
populations of the city, according to some witnesses.
3. Quality of Elected Officials
In addition to electing city leaders who effectively represent the city's
increasingly diverse population, many of the people we interviewed
stressed the importance of attracting high quality individuals to run
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for office. Portlanders have been fortunate, in recent years, to have
had a good selection of qualified candidates from which to choose.
Measure proponents and opponents have both suggested that the
quality of elected officials would be affected if the city were to
change to a strong mayor/council form of government.
Proponents of the Measure say the expanded role of the mayor and
more defined role of the council will draw a higher quality person to
the election. Opponents of the Measure say the significantly
expanded powers of the mayor may permit influential individuals or
groups to exert undue influence on city government. They also say
that removal of executive power from city council positions will
discourage good quality candidates from running for the city
council. However, many cities with district council elections
consistently draw strong candidates for city office.
Measure proponents suggest that district elections would encourage
a broad range of skilled and effective leaders in the community to
run for office—people who currently do not run because of the cost
and difficulty of running a city-wide campaign. Proponents said the
system also would increase the pool of experienced leaders available
to run for and serve in higher office.

4. Executive (and Administrative) Responsibilities
The executive responsibilities for city services generally include
administrators, long-range planning and implementation of such
planning. Additionally, the executive office serves as a resource to the
legislative office, coordinating efforts and re-aligning long-term
goals.
By electing the commissioners who oversee bureaus and
departments, Portland voters have more direct control over their
government than would be the case if all departments were under
the mayor. Whether this control is desirable or necessary is
debatable.

No one in charge vs. a mayor with too much power. The question of
whether to centralize executive power is at the heart of the decision
many peoples support for or opposition to the Measure.
Decentralized administrative systems often result in some degree of
inefficiency. How much inefficiency are we willing to tolerate to
avoid giving one person too much power? With executive
responsibility concentrated in a strong mayor, voters can hold one
person accountable for all of the actions of city government. Under
the current commission form, voters can hold a one person
responsible for each department of city government.
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When conflicts arise between bureaus, and the bureau managers
cannot resolve them, the commissioners must try to resolve them.
Proponents of the Measure have described situations when this has
caused a high level of inefficiency in the government. Both
commissioner and bureau staff people said that when council
members do not all agree on a broad policy initiative, bureau staff
and other interested parties sometimes use the disagreement to
avoid implementing programs they perceive are not in their bureau's
interest. One bureau director said bureau heads are sometimes
frustrated when they cannot directly approach other city
commissioners to work out issues with other bureaus, but are limited
to working through their own city commissioner. The bureau director
said that working under a unified executive is easier in many ways—
you know where to go to resolve a dispute and get definitive
direction.
Mayor Katz has called the current government "Byzantine and
dysfunctional." Mayor Katz said she is perceived as the chief
executive officer of the city, but has "senior managers" (the four
other commissioners) who are not directly responsible to her, and
directors of bureaus who do not report to her, but only to their own
commissioners. Katz believes that some complex municipal issues
necessarily involve many bureaus, and that a strong mayor/ council
form of government would simplify the coordination of efforts to
respond to these kinds of issues.
Mayor Katz cited the cleanup of the Willamette River as an example
of the problems with the commissioner form. The Bureaus of
Planning, Water, Environmental Services, and Parks and Recreation,
Portland Development Commission, and the Office of Management
and Finance all have a role to play but are not subject to the
discipline of a single coordinating authority. According to Katz, the
city's commission form of government is simply not flexible and
responsible enough clean up the Willamette River. She said that this
is why the federal government chose to impose its own fix on the city.
Other witnesses said a mayor with a more collaborative management
style of might have been more effective at working with other
commissioners and coordinating bureau activities within the existing
system.
Steve Bauer described Portland's current government as a "big,
robust, energetic, feudal system with lots of palace intrigue." Bauer
estimated, in round figures, a 25 percent loss of efficiency resulting
from the lack of unified executive authority in Portland's
commission form of government—Bauer referred to this as "friction
loss." He cited past examples when conflict between commissioners
led one commissioner to order his bureau staff not to cooperate in a
council strategic planning process, another in which feuding
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commissioners ordered their bureau directors not to speak to each
other. Other witnesses said this has not occurred for many years.
Bauer cited as another example of "friction loss," the problems with
the Water Bureau billing system. He believes the problems could
have been prevented if Water Bureau staff had not been able to work
through their commissioner to override the objections of the Office
of Financial Administration.
Opponents of the Measure point out that the "five mayors" do not
necessarily compete with one another. They collaborate, cooperate,
and compromise. They do not always and necessarily do these things
willingly. Champions of the commission form of government see this
as one of its best attributes—the required consensus building and
process of compromise is a strong check and balance against the will
of a single politician or a faction.
5. The Budget
The mayor has a large role in the formulation of the city budget in
both the current and proposed forms. Currently, the budget can be
adopted with the agreement of as few as three of the five city council
members. The mayor has only one of five votes. Under the Measure,
the budget could not be adopted without the consent of the mayor.
The Measure does not allow the city council to override the mayor's
veto of the budget. (The Measure would allow the council to override
the mayor's veto of most other types of ordinances with six of nine
votes.) While this places budgeting authority with the person in
charge of spending the money, it removes much authority from the
people's representatives. In theory, if the council could override the
mayor's budget veto, the mayor's power over the budget would be
reduced. In practice, witnesses said the mayor probably would not
have too much trouble finding four council members to block an
override.
The auditor—who is elected citywide—is responsible for a great
many fiscal administrative responsibilities, although the Mayor has
the lead with respect to planning and the budget process. According
to opponents of the change, the mayor would have too much power
over the city budget. Measure supporters discount the opposition's
concern. According to Ball, the mayor would "not be very strong"
because the city council would still have to approve expenditures
through the budget approval process and would continue to approve
most city contracts.
City budget and finance experts confirmed that the city council must
approve most contracts, strategic plans, budget changes, large
purchases, grant applications, capital plans, administrative rules and
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other proposals. These council approval practices are consistent with
practices of local governments across the nation. The only exception
is in the approval of administrative rules—under a strong mayor or
city manager form of government, that responsibility resides with the
single executive in charge.

6. Professional Management
Is the management of City government adequately professional?
Proponents of the change are concerned that current commissioners
are not professionally prepared to manage complex city bureaus.
Developer Pete Mark, considering the structure of his own business
operations, thinks that being both a policy-maker and an
administrator is extremely difficult and not advisable. "Let
competent people run the bureaus, rather than expecting that a
political person is equipped" to do so, said businessman Sho
Dozono. "Many of the bureaus are very difficult to handle and
require a great deal of expertise." According to Bauer, the rotation of
bureaus among commissioners exacerbates the problem by reducing
a commissioner's ability to gain expertise in the issues relating to a
particular bureau.
On the other side, opponents wonder how a single person might
effectively manage all of the city bureaus with a higher level of
professionalism and attentiveness than five people who devote a
large part of their time to the same job. Proponents note that most
other large city and state government operate successfully under a
unified executive.
Proponents of the change believe that having five co-equal
commissioners who oversee specific bureaus can result in turf
protection, buck passing and lack of clear leadership. Some
witnesses cited a lack of expert management in the bureaus as an
example of a serious structural problem with the current form of
government. They say the chances of electing a good administrator
are not particularly good—most voters do not choose a candidate
based on the candidate's administrative skills and management
experience. Dispersed executive authority also leads to a lack of
incentive for scrutiny of the budget, a slow decision-making process,
and a lack of strong political and executive leadership. Furthermore,
because current commissioners both create policy and direct the
bureaus affected by policy, proponents of the measure wonder
whether a serious conflict of interest exists within Portland's city
council.
Opponents of the Measure believe that the government currently
performs fairly well and are not convinced any improvements in
Portland's city government require changing the form of
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government. Any conflict of interest found in the current system,
they say, would exist in the new system as well.

7. Change is on the way?
Over the past fifteen years, the City Council has pursued ongoing
efforts to remedy some of the problems that result from the diffusion
of executive authority in Portland's government. The efforts have
focused primarily on centralizing certain financial and
administrative services but have also attempted to improve
coordination between bureaus.
Measure proponents question whether these changes go far
enough—and whether they will be fully implemented and sustained
without more unified authority and political leadership. A number of
people question whether the City Council as a whole will continue to
support changes when they begin to intrude on the turf of individual
commissioners and their bureaus. The recent "mutiny memo"
appears to be a sign of growing resistance to centralization (see
below). Measure opponents say the changes should be given a
chance to work. They say that to change the form of government now
would disrupt the process and lead to costly upheaval in city
government.
Office of Financial Management: In the mid-1980s, the City Council
combined existing financial management functions, such as
budgeting, accounting, treasury and debt management under a new
Office of Finance and Administration (OFA). Subsequently, some
aspects of personnel, computer services, and risk management were
added to OFA's responsibility. Efforts during the early 1990s to
develop citywide Human Resources policies were unsuccessful.
Office of Management and Finance and Chief Administrative
Officer: Over the past two years, the City Council embarked on a
major effort to increase the efficiency and reduce the cost of city
government administrative services. In May 2000, City Council
created the new Office of Management and Finance (OMF) to
manage the City's core administrative services and propose
improvements to administrative services in all city bureaus. (OMF
was created by merging the existing Office of Finance and
Administration,
the Bureau of General Services, and the Bureau of
8
Purchasing).
8 As of spring 2002, OMF includes eight bureaus, forty divisions, and over 400
employees. (OMF 2002-2007 Strategic Plan.) OMF areas of responsibility include:
financial management, accounting, treasury, debt/pension, financial planning,
communications, facilities management, fleet management, human resources,
information technology, printing and distribution, purchasing, and risk management.
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At the same time, the City Council also created new position of Chief
Administrative Officer (CAO). The Council put the CAO in charge of
OMF and gave him the responsibility and authority to coordinate the
administrative service functions of the City, suggest improvements
including the reorganization of bureaus where appropriate, and
implement recommendations approved by the City Council. Former
OFA Director Tim Grewe was appointed as CAO. The CAO serves at
the pleasure of the full city council, but reports directly to the mayor.
Administrative Services Review (ASR): OMF's first task was the
Administrative Services Review (ASR). The City Council set a goal of a
10 percent cost reduction in administrative services citywide for the
2000-2002 biennium. OMF prepared framework plans for each
service area. The process was completed by February 2001. The CAO
recommended a strategy of greater centralization of administrative
services, beginning with centralization of human resources and
information technology services citywide. The City Council agreed,
and directed the CAO to implement the centralization of human
resources and information technology services by April 2001. OMF
continues to review other service areas for possible centralization.
"Mutiny Memo": One year after the completion of the ASR and
OMF's initial centralization of services, city bureaus and their
commissioners began to push back. In January 2002, four bureau
directors released a memo—now referred to as the "mutiny
memo"—that criticized the effectiveness and efficiency of OMF's
centralization program. The memo was sent by the directors of BES,
PDOT, OPDR, and the Water Bureau to their respective
commissioners -in-charge (Hales, Saltzman, and Sten). The three
directors wrote:
"The Administrative Services Review (ASR) process,
which is now one year old, has yielded some savings,
but in many areas costs have only shifted, not decreased.
In others, costs are actually increasing. In some cases,
centralizing support services has moved resources
without moving all the associated workload, leaving
line staff without adequate support and the central
service bureau potentially over-resourced."
The directors suggested total reductions at OMF of 19 full time
employees to achieve an estimated savings of $2.7 million.
The Oregonian reported that Commissioner Hales had requested the
memo because Mayor Katz and CAO Tim Grewe were responding to
a large budget shortfall by cutting bureau programs without first
considering cuts in central administrative services. The article said
the three city commissioners and bureau directors recommended
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cuts at OMF to reduce the office's "large number of highly paid
administrative staff" and the high number of "high-level generalist
positions" in OMF's top administration. They complained that
OMF's centralization effort had not produced promised cost savings
and that the quality of services to the bureaus had declined.
( Oregonian , 02/20/2002.)
CAO Tim Grewe responded in a memo (dated February 19, 2002), in
which he charged that many of the recommendations in the "mutiny
memo" were made without adequate context and based on
erroneous and/or insufficient information. Grewe wrote that many
of the recommendations would result in "decreased council
oversight of financial and citywide system integrity...." Grewe noted
that the bureau directors suggested that he cut the number of his
financial analysts from 10 to 5, while the bureaus would retain 74
analysts. He warned that these reductions would reduce OMF's
ability to provide effective oversight of city operations. ( Oregonian ,
02/20/2002.)
Bureau Head Group: In 2000, Gil Kelley began his tenure as Portland
planning director with a mandate from the City Council to convene
regular meetings of directors of bureaus involved in planning and
development. Council members hoped this would improve cooperation and coordination between the bureaus. The participants were to
share information and talk about issues. The Council did not give
Kelley the authority to mandate any actions from other bureaus.
Kelley told your Committee that the group quickly grew to 25 to 30
people as directors and representatives of other bureaus began to
attend. (A subgroup of bureau representatives is now working to
coordinate bureau activities under the umbrella of the Willamette
River Renaissance plan.)
One bureau director said the meetings are not particularly useful—
he said it is hard to accomplish much with 25 people in a room for
an hour. Others questioned whether the cooperation between
bureau heads will break down when bureaus moved beyond talking
and started to make decisions that affect staffing, funding, and other
turf issues.
C. Does Measure 26-30 propose a form of government that will
solve those problems?
This section highlights specific aspects of the Measure that may be
viewed separately from either the questions of the functioning of the
city, or the form of government. While the previous section describes
different views about the strong mayor/council and commission
forms of government, this section addresses two topics specifically
related to Measure 26-30: the initiative process that landed it on the
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May ballot, and the financial impact questions surrounding the
Measure.

1. Bringing the Measure to the ballot
The efforts, vision, and financing of a small group of business and
labor representatives, led primarily by Robert Ball, brought the
Measure to the ballot. Ball believes that Portland's city government is
dysfunctional and attributes this dysfunction to good people fighting
against the restrictions and impediments of the commission form of
government.
The process Ball used to develop the initiative struck some as in
appropriately exclusive. Ball retained an attorney with extensive
background working with Portland's city government to draft the
Measure. While a wider public discussion might have altered
elements of the Measure, such as whether the Council should have
been able to override a Mayor's veto of the budget or whether the
election of seven Council members should be by district, the
Measure as drafted ultimately secured sufficient public support; the
campaign gathered 40,000 signatures, more than enough to meet the
26,095 valid signatures necessary to qualify City of Portland
measures for the May 2002 ballot election. Measure opponents, however, question how many of the people who signed the measure
actually read it or understood its provisions.
Ron Paul, chief of staff to City Commissioner Charlie Hales, criticized
Ball's use of the initiative process. Paul has stated that a full public
review of the City Charter would be more appropriate. "The trouble
is, drafting a referral and paying signature gatherers, is that good
government?" Paul queried rhetorically.
A number of witnesses said such a dramatic change to Portland's
form of government should have been developed through an
inclusive and open public process, such as a formal charter review
commission. Some Measure opponents suggested that citizens
should vote "No" on the Measure but push the City Council to
appoint such a commission. Other individuals noted that Portland's
City Charter has not been significantly changed since 1913 and is
probably due for an overhaul. Other individuals suggested that
Portland's charter should be reviewed regularly to ensure that it stays
current. The Multnomah County Charter requires appointment of a
charter review committee every six years to identify and recommend
any needed changes to the county charter. The committee includes
state senators and representatives who appoint additional "electors."
(The next review of the county charter will be in 2004.)
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Former Portland Mayor Neil Goldschmidt questioned whether
focusing on amending the charter is the right place to start. He
suggested that the process should start with a broad and inclusive
discussion of what is working well and what is not in Portland's
government. He said this process could be used to determine
whether the city charter needs to be changed or whether other
actions (or a combination of the two) would better serve our
community.
Some believe broader review would have corrected the technical
error regarding the effective date of the Measure. The error would
institute the new form of government one year before the seven
district council members and the first strong mayor would assume
office. This would leave Portland without an effective government for
one year. 9 While dates establishing the election of district council
members and the first strong mayor are correct, the very last section
should have read: "Effective Date: This Amended and Restated
Charter shall be effective January 1, 2005." (Ball noted that the City
Attorney also missed the date error when he reviewed the Measure
and prepared the caption, question, and summary for the official
ballot title.) The City Council declined a request by Ball to refer a
corrected version of the Measure to the May 2002 ballot. However, a
majority of commissioners have stated that they will quickly refer a
correction to voters if the Measure passes in May.
Others were not concerned that this was a "private" initiative,
recognizing the initiative process as a legitimate part of Portland's
legislative system that does not require full public discourse to bring
a measure to the ballot. These individuals point out that any
inadequacies might easily be remedied through a city council referral
or by a subsequent citizen initiative. Mayor Vera Katz did not find the
Measure's process problematic. She and other witnesses said they
appreciated that Ball forced a public discussion of Portland's form of
government.
Some witnesses said that, viewed as a practical matter, it is unlikely
that currently elected Commissioners would change the government
structure to one that reduces their authority—at least absent some
strong external pressure. The initiative process gives citizens a way to
raise those issues for public referendum.
9
New section added, in accordance with the last section of the proposed measure: "The
City Auditor shall promptly restate the Charter as amended by these amendments, and
in that process, the Auditor is authorized to make any other language changes consistent
with these amendments (such as, changing a reference from "Commissioner" to
"Council Member"). If there are any inconsistencies between these Amendments and
the un-amended provisions of the Charter, then these Amendments shall control and
the Auditor, in restating the Charter as amended by these Amendments, shall conform
the other provisions of the Charter to be consistent with these Amendments. Effective
Date: This Amended and Restated Charter shall be effective January 1, 2004. "
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While the initiative is clearly a legal process by which to amend the
city charter, the City Club, in recent years, has cautioned that a
significant weakness of the initiative system is that it does not
generally lead to "informed and deliberative decision-making."
(1996, Initiative and Referendum in Oregon ; 1997, Process and
Structure of the Oregon Legislature .)
2. Financial Impact
The likely financial impacts of the Measure are not clear. Unlike the
financial impact analyses that accompany statewide ballot measures,
no such formal analysis is required for city ballot measures. No
evaluation of the financial impact of the Measure has been done. Any
effort to estimate the financial impact of Measure 26-30 would be a
complex and subjective endeavor. Broad choices about the scope of
the costs and cost-savings considered and more specific
assumptions on a myriad of details could lead to a wide range of cost
estimates.
The campaigns for and against the measure have focused on
whether the number of city staff would increase under the measure.
Ball maintains that the number and cost of staff would remain the
same. Opponents believe the number of staff will be higher. A
number of witnesses predicted that the city council would insist on
additional budget and policy analysis staff to reduce the council's
significant staff disadvantage compared to the mayor. Our analyses
showed that the cost impact of additional staff is relatively small
compared to the overall magnitude of the city budget.
Much more significant are the possible cost savings or increases that
would result from a dramatic restructuring of city government and
the subsequent improvement or decline in efficiency and
effectiveness. Aside from Steve Bauer's suggestion that a strong
mayor system would reduce what he estimated as the 25 percent
"friction loss" under the commission system, no analysis exists of
this potentially significant financial impact.
Opponents of the measure and other witnesses believe that the
process of implementing a change in government has its own cost.
One witness said the savings of the change would have to
significantly exceed the transition costs to make the change
worthwhile. Some suggested that full implementation of the change
could take as long as four years. During the transition, uncertainty
could defer decision-making. Time spent on process changes would
mean less time attending to community needs and city programs
and services. Opponents do not accept that increased efficiencies
and improved services will occur, and, therefore, do not believe that
indirect costs will decrease—indeed, they may increase.
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Proponents of the measure respond that only a relatively small share
of the city workforce would be directly involved in the process of
change. Bureau staff would continue to report to their bureau
director. Bureau directors would simply report to one of the five new
department heads, instead of a city commissioner. Proponents
expect that any incidental increases in direct costs will be more than
offset by lower overall administrative costs, improved services
delivery and increased benefits for citizens from better decisionmaking on land-use policy and major capital investments.
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V. MAJORITY CONCLUSIONS
We are right to be proud of Portland: it is internationally recognized
as a vibrant, livable city. We should also be proud of our local
government: the strong and at times visionary leadership of our
elected City leaders and the expertise of our City staff have also
gained international regard. However, these achievements are
despite, not because of our form of City government. The
commission structure of City government has hindered us in many
ways that, while not highly visible, are nonetheless palpable,
pervasive and persistent.
We now have the opportunity to eliminate this long-standing and
costly barrier to better government for Portland. The majority
strongly recommends a YES vote on Measure 26-30.
A. Unifying Executive Responsibility Under the Mayor Will Result
in Better Value for Our Tax Dollars
After fifteen years of repeated attempts to remedy the deficiencies of
the commission form of government, there are two primary reasons
that the core problems have not been resolved. First, remedial efforts
have been limited to administrative, not operational functions.
Second, although the City Council recently took new steps to remedy
fragmented and inconsistent administrative practices by establishing
a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), that person is selected by and
serves at the pleasure of the full Council, not the Mayor alone. Just as
the Mayor must get three votes to get anything done, so must the
CAO. The well publicized "mutiny memo" is evidence that the City
bureaus and their commissioners have already begun what will
undoubtedly be persistent efforts to resist and undermine this
centralization. The majority believes that these improvements
cannot be fully implemented and sustained unless there is a
structural change in the form of government.
The charter change to unify executive and administrative
responsibilities under the mayor will:

• Develop a unified team of experienced, professional managers
under the direction of the Mayor to lead this large, complex
organization with a $1.45 billion budget and over 6,000 employees;
• Create accountability for achieving the City's strategic goals and
for solving complex problems that need the support of multiple
bureaus;
• Ensure implementation of administrative improvements ,
including stronger management and financial oversight of
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operational bureaus by the Chief Administrative Officer,
responsible to the Mayor;

• Reduce administrative redundancy and the "friction loss" costs of
time wasted by both city staff and elected officials drawn into
unproductive organizational politics; and
• Make the government more flexible and adaptive, unhindered by
the need to balance power among five elected officials.
The mayoral authority established by this charter change is
consistent with practices elsewhere: it is not "too strong." The
council members will retain policy-making and oversight authority.
As a practical matter, the mayor will still need to work in a collegial,
collaborative manner with the whole council.
This change to centralize executive authority under the mayor is
imperative. It represents a necessary realignment of power in the city
government that will only occur through an initiative process. Our
positive regard for our current City commissioners, who may not like
the resulting reduction in their executive authority, should not blind
us to the significant and far-reaching benefits that will come with
this change in our form of government. Taxpayers will get better
value from their City government with passage of Measure 26-30.
B. Creating a Full-time Legislative Council Will Improve Citizen
Representation and Legislative Effectiveness
Citizens generally feel disconnected from their governments and
their elected officials. The proposed charter changes would redefine
the role of city council members to be solely legislative, thereby
allowing council members to give full attention and allegiance to
being citizen representatives and exercising legislative
responsibilities. We expect this will increase citizen understanding of
and confidence in Portland city government.
The charter change will position our nine city council members to:

• Better represent and advocate for citizens concerned with
governmental performance, unimpeded by the ambivalence that
stems from dual administrative/legislative roles or by reluctance to
tread on the "turf" of other elected officials;
• Engage citizens and community partners in collaborative
planning, policy-making, and community improvement efforts;
• Conduct investigations necessary to obtain information for
intelligent legislation;
• Provide policy leadership on important, complex issues where
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personal expertise and interest align with community needs;

• Foster open public policy discussions at city council meetings and
in the community around the City's strategic direction, annual
budget decisions and other important issues; and
• Provide policy direction and legislative oversight for the mayor
and city staff.
There is plenty of work to keep nine council members busy full-time
in these legislative roles. We observe that Multnomah County has
full-time, non-partisan commissioners who function effectively
while performing solely legislative responsibilities. Similarly, the City
can also expect to continue to attract dedicated, quality candidates
to the council positions.
C. Electing Council Members by District Will Make it Less
Expensive to Run for Office and Will Open the Door to More
Diverse Candidates
A district campaign opens the door to many more people who aspire
to council office, because a door-to-door campaign in a district of
about 75,000 residents is feasible and will not require high cost
media ads. In the past thirty years, Portland has increased not only in
population but also in area-now extending out as far east as 175th
Avenue. Thus, at-large campaigns are increasingly more difficult and
expensive. High election costs are a perennial concern at all levels of
government because it raises the appearance, if not the reality, of
undue influence by large contributors.
Election of seven of the council members from districts is likely to:

• Increase the economic diversity of Council members due to lower
cost elections and geographic residency requirements; and
• Increase the visibility of and citizens' sense of access to elected
officials by having them work from offices in neighborhoods
dispersed across the city.
While district representatives will of course pay specific attention to
the unique problems of their respective neighborhoods, we believe
those seven council members will generally join the two at-large
council members in voting for what is best for the city as a whole.
Constituent interests and positions will vary enough within districts
that council members will be motivated to provide balanced
leadership and represent community views. As a practical matter,
elected officials who take an overly parochial approach probably will
not be re-elected.
It is clearly beneficial to reduce the cost of running for public office
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and open the door to more diversity, and the establishment of
district seats will do that. Whether it is optimal to have a total of nine
elected officials, with two at-large, and whether it is best to have the
mayor separate from the council is not as certain, but it is promising.
The experience of Metro suggests that the council and the
community will be quite willing to make changes to the framework
in the future, should that appear appropriate.
D. The Overall Fiscal Impact is Positive
Although there has been no formal financial analysis of the ballot
measure, any incremental costs pale in comparison to the savings
that we believe would result from the improved efficiency and
effectiveness of a strong mayor/council form of government.
E. Use of the Initiative Process Is Appropriate for this Type of
Change
Measure 26-30 arrived on the ballot without the benefit of
widespread public review or debate. That process alienated some
potential supporters. While we might have preferred to see this
measure emerge from a more inclusive community process, the fact
remains that the ballot measure is fundamentally sound and it will
significantly improve Portland's governance. And that, after all, is
what we see as the real issue.
We also recognize that the measure has a technical flaw in providing
that its effective date is January 1, 2004, rather than January 1, 2005.
However, should the measure pass, we have no doubt that the current city council will refer a timely corrective measure to the ballot,
as a majority of council members has already promised.
F. A City Charter Review Process is Not Planned
The argument that a charter review should be initiated in lieu of
passing the proposed measure is unpersuasive. Recognizing that four
of the five sitting commissioners have a vested interest in
maintaining the status quo, we are skeptical that City Council would
establish a charter review process if the measure does not pass.
G. Summary
Between 1961 and 1999, four City Club committees have urged that
Portland change its form of government from the Commission form
to the Strong Mayor/Council form. Despite attempts over the past 15
years to patch over the deficiencies in the commission form and to
achieve greater coordination of central administrative functions,
those efforts have fallen far short of what is needed. Portland's city
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government, as Mayor Katz correctly notes, remains "Byzantine and
dysfunctional."
A "YES" vote to change Portland's form of government will remove
the structural barriers that increase costs of government and leave
citizens disenfranchised. If adopted, this measure will:

• Unify executive responsibility under the mayor , resulting in better
value for our tax dollars;
• Change the role of Council members to full-time legislators , which
will improve citizen representation and legislative effectiveness;
and
• Make it less expensive to run for office and diversify the potential
candidate pool by electing seven of the nine new Council
members from districts around the City.

VI. MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION
The majority recommends a "YES" vote on Ballot Measure 26-30.
Respectfully submitted,
Nancy Glerum
Andrew Käser
Carter Kennedy
Heather Kmetz
Paul Meyer
Ken Ray
Meganne Steele
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VII. MINORITY CONCLUSIONS
While the Minority and Majority of the Committee are in agreement
with the analysis of the problem as contained in this report, we differ
in the answer to the question; "Will Portland city government be
better if the voters approve ballot measure 26-30?" The Minority is of
the opinion that the answer is that it will not and, therefore,
recommends a "No" vote on the initiative.
There are a number of specific reasons given by individual members
of the committee for this decision, including some or all of the
following.
A. Are There Critical Problems with the Functioning of City
Government?
• A minority of the committee recognizes that there are functional
problems with the current city structure. However, it cannot
necessarily be concluded that these problems will be better
managed under a strong mayor form of government.
• It is also possible that current processes underway in city
government can ameliorate many of the problems that the current
structure may have created.
B. Does the Form of City Government Need to Be Changed?

1. Legislative Duties and Responsibilities
• The function of city government is largely administration as
opposed to legislation. The current commission workload,
predominantly administrative, reflects that reality.
• City councils, where council members are legislators only and do
not directly administer city agencies, such as in Seattle, commonly
divide up the responsibility for overseeing different areas of city
operations among the council members.
• Council members who do not have a role defined by city charter
are largely free to create their own job responsibilities. These can
influence the functioning of city government in a negative
manner.
• Current commissioners are able to develop expertise in the
bureaus that they oversee. It is true that currently the
commissioners refrain from criticizing fellow commissioners,
however, current procedures, if fully implemented, may change
this dynamic.
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• It is arguable whether legislative oversight would be enhanced by
the measure.

2. Access to Effective, Diverse Representation
• Recent history of the Portland City Council does reflect diverse
representation. Because diverse populations are scattered
throughout Portland, there is no assurance that district-based
elections would increase diversity.
• The proposed measure would increase the number of
representatives, but not increase access and effectiveness. In fact,
it is arguable that representatives who have little direct authority,
little staff support (based on the proponent's cost estimates) and
ill-defined responsibilities will offer any effectiveness at all.

3. Quality of Elected Officials
• The current (and recent) quality of commissioners, by any
measure, must be considered high.
• There is no basis for a belief that the proposed measure will
enhance the quality of officials.

4. Executive (and Administrative) Responsibilities
• There is redundancy and inconsistency in the current city
government. This has been recognized by the current city council
that has adopted a number of procedures to respond to these
concerns. Redundancy and inconsistency is not exclusive to the
commissioner form of governance but is a problem that all large
organizations must deal with.
• Citywide representation coupled with direct responsibility for
running effective bureaus favors collaboration and fosters
openness of decision making among the commissioners. This
collaboration can lead to better decisions than might occur when
the discussion occurs between the council members as a result of
their oversight responsibilities. There is serious concern that with
the initiative is that the mayor or staff members can make more
decisions without public discussion.
• The number of bureaus and functions that will become the sole
responsibility of the mayor will create responsibilities that are too
diverse to oversee well. It will, in all likelihood, result in
management of the city by managers who are not responsible to
the public. The commissioner form allows deep expertise and
commitment of effective functioning to develop among elected
officials.
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5. Budget
• The current system gives commissioners the opportunity to
develop a comprehensive understanding of the budgets of specific
bureaus.
• The commission system allows each of the five elected
commissioners to give focused and politically-accountable
executive attention to the development of their bureaus' budgets.
Under a strong mayor, this review would be delegated to five nonelected department heads. The sole elected executive, the strong
mayor, could not provide a similar level of attention and oversight
to individual bureau budgets.

6. Professional Managers
• The current city structure utilizes well-qualified, professional
managers for each existing bureau. There is no reason to accept
the proposition that the proposed measure will result in any more
qualified individuals.

7. Change is on the way?
• As previously noted, there are a number of processes under way
that are designed to alleviate many of the issues raised by critics
of the current system.
• The measures are not fully implemented and any "mutiny" by
existing department heads should be expected and welcomed. A
thorough airing of all aspects of the change should result in a
better long-term procedure.
C. Does Ballot Measure 26-30 provide a reasonable vehicle for
change?

1. Bringing the Measure to the ballot
• It is important to note that the minority did not make their
decision based on any real or perceived drafting errors in the
proposed initiative. It is more than likely that, should the measure
pass, the current council will make whatever changes necessary to
ensure a smooth transition to a new system.
• Nor did the minority base their decision on concerns about the
method by which the proposal was developed. The minority feels
that a more open public process most likely would have produced
a proposal that had broader support in the community.

2. Concerns about the measure
• The current system allows the government to function effectively
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when a weak mayor is elected.
• The mayor will not be a member of the city council, thus reducing
the opportunities and necessity for collaborative problem solving
• The mayor can remove members of city boards and commissions
without the consent of the council.
• The ability of the council to impact the budgeting process will be
severely restricted by reduced assess to information, lack of
adequate staff analysis capability, a very short period of time
provided for the council to review the budget, and the inability of
the council to override a mayoral veto on budget matters.
• District representation has the potential of creating parochialism
among the council members.
3. Fiscal Impact
• There has been no attempt at a fiscal impact of the proposed
measure done by any individual or agency.
• While only conjecture, recent history demonstrates that the
creation of additional elected offices will bring with it enhanced
demand for staffing and other support.
• The revenue neutral position suggested by the proponents of the
measure ignores several key components of potential cost.
• There will be significant cost, both fiscal and opportunity, during
any transitional phase. The benefits of this cost are not balanced
by any perceived benefit from the proposed measure.
D. Summary
The minority supports the proposition that the city government can
improve. The most effective way to make improvements is to
carefully examine the nature of the problems and alternative
solutions to those problems. A change from the commissioner form
of government to a strong mayor form may be the wrong approach.
Portland has accomplished some remarkable things since the City
Club report recommended changing the form of government in
1961. Is it possible that those changes came about because of the
form of government rather than in spite of it? That question needs to
be answered before the current system is changed.
Next Steps: There are different ways to accomplish this; through a
Charter Review Commission or a "Blue Ribbon Panel" that would
examine the issues, including a determination of whether charter
changes are required. A review of this kind should be part of a
periodic review process. The adoption of this proposal without wide51
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spread community support could result in significant disruption and
lost opportunities that, at this critical period in our community's
history, cannot be tolerated.
In closing, the Minority urges Club members and the public to vote
" NO" vote on Ballot Measure 26-30.

VIII. MINORITY RECOMMENDATION
The Minority of your Committee recommends a "NO" vote on
Measure 26-30.
Respectfully submitted,
Caitlin Baggott
Carolyn Bullard
Bryan Redd
Alan Brickley, chair
Paul Millius, research advisor (for the full committee)
Paul Leistner, research director (for the full committee)
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IX. APPENDICES
A. WITNESS LIST

Robert Ball , chief petitioner, Measure 26-30
Steve Bauer , former director, Office of Financial Administration, City
of Portland
Gary Blackmer , Portland City Auditor
Bruce M. Brooks, former deputy mayor, City of Seattle
Mike Burton , executive officer, Metro
Steve Dotterer, principal planner, Bureau of Planning, City of
Portland
Sho Dozono , president and CEO, Azumano Travel
Tom Feely, chief administrative services manager, Office of
Management and Finance, City of Portland
Neil Goldschmidt, former mayor, City of Portland
Tim Grewe , chief administrative officer, City of Portland
Charlie Hales, city commissioner, City of Portland
Michael Harrison , commissioner's assistant to Portland City
Commissioner Jim Francesconi
Vera Katz , mayor, City of Portland
Gil Kelley , director, Bureau of Planning, City of Portland
Jewel Lansing, former Portland City Auditor
Dave Logsdon, project manager, Office of Management and Finance,
City of Portland
Pete Mark , board chairman, Melvin Mark Properties
Dean Marriott, director, Bureau of Environmental Services, City of
Portland
Donald S. McClave, president and CEO, Portland Metropolitan
Chamber of Commerce
Dave Redlich , president, Homestead Neighborhood Association
John Russell , president, Russell Development Company, Inc.; acting
secretary, Portland Development Commission
Ethan Seltzer, director, Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies,
College of Urban and Public Affairs, Portland State University
Chris Smith , co-chair, Transportation Subcommittee, Northwest
District Association
Erik Sten , city commissioner, City of Portland
Brother Donald Strabrowski , academic vice president, University of
Portland
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C. CURRENT BUREAU ASSIGNMENTS — SPRING 2002
Mayor Vera Katz ("Commissioner of Finance and Administration")
• Office of Management and Finance (includes: Bureaus of
Communications & Networking/Financial Management/Financial
Planning/Human Resources/ Information Technology/ General
Services/ Purchases)
• Office of the City Attorney
• Office of Government Relations
• Office of International Relations
• Bureau of Planning
• Bureau of Police
• Portland Development Commission
Jim Francesconi (Position #1: "Commissioner of Public Utilities")
• Portland Parks and Recreation
• Bureau of Licenses
• Bureau of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services
Charlie Hales (Position #4: "Commissioner of Public Safety")
• Office of Transportation (PDOT)
• Office of Planning and Development Review (OPDR)
Dan Saltzman (Position #3: "Commissioner of Public Affairs")
•
•
•
•

Bureau of Environmental Services (BES)
Office of Neighborhood Involvement (ONI)
Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC)
Office of Sustainable Development (OSD)

Erik Sten (Position #2: "Commissioner of Public Works")
•
•
•
•

Bureau of Water Works
Bureau of Hydro Power
Office of Cable Communications and Franchise Management
Bureau of Housing and Community Development

Gary Blackmer (Auditor of the City of Portland)
• Assessement and Liens
• Audit Services
• City Elections
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• City Recorder (Archives/ Contracts and Disbursement/ Council
Clerk/Records Management)
• Hearings Officers
• Independent Police Review
• Ombudsman
• Portland Multnomah Progress Board
• Secretary; Fire & Police Disability and Retirement Fund Board
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D. MEASURE 26-30: PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
PROVISIONS

1. Proposed Legislative Charter Provisions
An overview of the Charter modifications involving
the Council members are delineated below; those provisions
affecting the Legislative Power are highlighted:
§ 2-102 - The City Council of the City of Portland
shall consist of nine (9) Council Members.
§ 2-105(a) (3) - To provide for entering into contracts
by the City for a period not exceeding five (5) years and the extension
or renewal thereof by option or otherwise, for not to exceed an
additional five (5) years, except as to property contracts, which may
extend for more than five (5) years, or as otherwise permitted by the
Charter or by statute or by ordinance approved by the Council.
§ 2- 110 - . . . The President [of the Council] shall
preside at all meetings of the Council. In the President's absence or
disability, the Council shall elect one of their number to perform the
duties of President during such absence.
§ 2-117 - . . . Every Council Member, when present,
must vote unless a majority of the remainder of the Council approves
the member's excuse for disqualification, and every ordinance shall
require the vote of five (5) members . Promptly after the passage of
an ordinance the ordinance shall be delivered to the Mayor for
signature by the Mayor. The ordinance shall become effective
according to its terms when the Mayor has signed the ordinance. If
the ordinance is not signed by the Major within ten (10) days of the
passage of any ordinance or resolution, except for: ordinances that
result from the City's exercise of quasi-judicial authority, an
ordinance filling a Council Member's vacancy, or an ordinance
overriding the Mayor's veto, the Mayor may veto such ordinance by a
written veto statement signed by the Mayor. For all ordinances
except those adopting or amending the City's budget, the Council
may at any subsequent Council meeting within thirty (30) days of
the Mayor's veto, override the Mayor's veto by the affirmative vote
of six (6) Council members, and the ordinance shall thereby become
effective, without the Mayor's signature.
§ 2-128 - The Mayor shall propose a City budget for
the City's fiscal year and shall submit the budget to the Council at
least thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of the City's fiscal year.
The Council may approve of the Mayor's budget or may amend that
budget. The budget or an amended budget shall not be effective
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unless and until it is approved of by: the Mayor and a majority of the
Council. All funds of the City shall be expended only in
conformance with a Council approved budget, or an amendment to
that budget.
§ 2-201(A) - . . . All said officers shall be elected as
follows: the Mayor, Auditor and two (2) Council Members shall be
elected at large and seven (7) Council Members shall be elected by
districts, except as otherwise provided.
§ 2-206(f) - If a vacancy occurs in the Office of the
Mayor or Auditor, the Council shall fill the officer by appointment
pending election as provided herein , and the appointee need not be
a Council Member. If a vacancy occurs in the Council, the Council
may appoint a person to act as the Council Member until the election of the Council Member. If the vacancy is in a district Council
Member position, the acting Council Member shall meet the residency and voting requirements . . .
§ 2-206(h) - Upon the vacancy of the office of Mayor,
the Council shall appoint an individual to serve as Mayor until an
election can be held to fill the office of the Mayor.
§ 2-301 - . . .Additional Departments may be created
by ordinance.
§ 2-601 - The City Attorney shall be a member in
good standing of the Bar of the State of Oregon. The City Attorney
may have one or more deputies who are members of the Bar of the
State of Oregon to be appointed by the City Attorney in writing and
continued during the City Attorney's pleasure. The number and
compensation of such deputies shall be fixed by the Council and
they shall be deemed removed on the removal or resignation of the
City Attorney. The Chief of Police shall have had at least ten years
active police experience.
§ 2-602 - . . .Each Council Member shall be entitled
to hire two (2) full-time staff assistants at City expense. Such
employees shall serve at the pleasure of the Council Member which
[sic] hired them. . .
§ 2-605 - No person shall at any time hold more than
one office yielding pecuniary compensation under this Charter or
under the Mayor, Council or any Departments of the City, unless
such offices are part-time or the hours of work of one of such offices
do not conflict with the hours of the other office and such
employment in different offices is expressly authorized by order of
the Mayor.
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§ 11 -201 - . . . The Council or the Mayor may make
rules and regulations for management and control of the auditorium facilities and services.

2. Proposed Executive (and Administrative) Charter Provisions
An overview of the Charter modifications involving
the Mayor and Professional Administrators are delineated below;
those provisions affecting the Executive Power (and Administrative
Power) are highlighted:
§ 2- 101 - The municipal powers and authority of the
City are vested as follows: ... all executive and administrative
authority is vested in the Mayor.
§ 2-103 - The Mayor may create such advisory
boards or advisory commissions, as the Mayor deems necessary or
convenient, on such terms as the Mayor deems appropriate.
§2-104 - The Council shall not interfere with the
exercise by the Mayor of the executive and administrative powers
granted to the Mayor under this Charter.
§ 2-117 - . . . Promptly after the passage of an
ordinance, the ordinance shall be delivered to the Mayor for
signature by the Mayor. The ordinance shall become effective
according to its terms when the Mayor has signed the ordinance. If
the ordinance is not signed by the Major within ten (10) days of the
passage of any ordinance or resolution, except for: ordinances that
result from the City's exercise of quasi-judicial authority, an
ordinance filling a Council Member's vacancy, or an ordinance
overriding the Mayor's veto, the Mayor may veto such ordinance by
a written veto statement signed by the Mayor. For all ordinances
except those adopting or amending the City's budget, the Council
may at any subsequent Council meeting within thirty (30) days of the
Mayor's veto, override the Mayor's veto by the affirmative vote of six
(6) Council members, and the ordinance shall thereby become
effective, without the Mayor's signature.
§ 2-128 - The Mayor shall propose a City budget for
the City's fiscal year and shall submit the budget to the Council at
least thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of the City's fiscal year.
The Council may approve of the Mayor's budget or may amend that
budget. The budget or an amended budget shall not be effective
unless and until it is approved of by: the Mayor and a majority of the
Council. All funds of the City shall be expended only in conformance
with a Council approved budget, or an amendment to that budget.
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§ 2-201 (A) - . . .All said officers shall be elected as
follows: the Mayor, Auditor and two (2) Council Members shall be
elected at large and seven (7) Council Members shall be elected by
districts, except as otherwise provided.
§ 2-301 - The executive and administrative powers,
authority and duties, not otherwise provided for herein shall,
subject to the overall authority of the Mayor, be distributed among
at least five (5) departments . . . The Mayor may establish bureaus or
offices within Departments and a bureau or office shall be a separate functional component of a Department. The Mayor shall, from
time to time, allocate work, functions and responsibilities among
Departments, bureaus and offices . . .Additional Departments may
be created by ordinance.
§ 2-302 - The Mayor shall prescribe the powers and
duties of officers and employees, may assign particular officers to
one or more of the departments and may require an officer or
employee to perform duties in two or more departments. The
Mayor shall make such rules and regulations as may be necessary
and proper for the efficient and economical conduct of the business
of the City.
§ 2-401 - The Mayor has all of the duties, authorities
and responsibilities as the chief executive officer of the City and has
all executive and administrative authority possessed by the City,
except to the extent limited by this Charter. The Mayor shall be
authorized to submit proposed ordinances and resolutions to the
Council. The Mayor shall exercise a careful supervision over the
executive and administrative business of the City.
§ 2-406 - The salary of the Mayor shall be at least
equal to the average of the salary of all Department Directors.
§ 2-407 - In the event that the Mayor is physically
incapacitated for a period of time, and is incapable of performing the
responsibilities of that office, but a vacancy in the office of the Mayor
has not occurred, then the Mayor's Chief of State shall serve as acting
Mayor until the incapacity is remedied and the Mayor is capable of
performing the responsibilities of the position of Mayor.
§ 2-505(b) - City bureau managers shall respond to
audit recommendations made by the Auditor, through the Mayor, to
the Auditor, in writing within the time specified by the Auditor...
§ 2-601 (a) - The Mayor shall appoint the City
Attorney subject to the confirmation of the Council. The Mayor
shall have the authority to appoint, manage and remove the
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following appointed officers: a Director and a Deputy Director of
each Department, bureau or office and such appointed officers
shall serve at the pleasure of the Mayor. Each such appointed officer
shall possess education, professional training and prior working
experience reasonably commensurate with the office to which such
person is being appointed.
§ 2-601(b) - The Mayor shall appoint persons to
serve on all appointive City boards and commissions subject to
confirmation by the Council. Such persons may be removed at any
time by the Mayor.
§ 2-601 - The City Attorney shall be a member in
good standing of the Bar of the State of Oregon. The City Attorney
may have one or more deputies who are members of the Bar of the
State of Oregon to be appointed by the City Attorney in writing and
continued during the City Attorney's pleasure. The number and
compensation of such deputies shall be fixed by the Council and
they shall be deemed removed on the removal or resignation of the
City Attorney. The Chief of Police shall have had at least ten years
active police experience.
§ 2-601(a) - The Mayor shall appoint the City
Attorney subject to the confirmation of the Council. The Mayor
shall have the authority to appoint, manage and remove the
following appointed officers: a Director and a Deputy Director of
each Department, bureau or office and such appointed officers
shall serve at the pleasure of the Mayor. Each such appointed officer shall possess education, professional training and prior working
experience reasonably commensurate with the office to which such
person is being appointed.
§2-603 - The Mayor shall have the power to create
and abolish all such subordinate offices, places and employments
in the service of the City as the Mayor may deem necessary for
efficient and economical administration.
§ 2-605 - No person shall at any time hold more than
one office yielding pecuniary compensation under this Charter or
under the Mayor, Council or any Departments of the City, unless
such offices are part-time or the hours of work of one of such offices
do not conflict with the hours of the other office and such employment in different offices is expressly authorized by order of the
Mayor.
§ 11-201 - . . .The Council or the Mayor may make
rules and regulations for management and control of the auditorium facilities and services.
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§ 12-102 - The Mayor may make regulations and
impose restrictions on public use of parks, recreational areas and
facilities as found needed and appropriate ...
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Ballot Measure

Resolution
Ballot Measure 26-32 :

Multnomah County Library Five-Year Levy

City Club Resolution “YES” on 26-32
“Knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we
know where to find information upon it. " Dr. Samuel Johnson,
April 18, 1775
Recognizing the great importance of the Multnomah County
Library as a free educational and cultural resource available to all
adults and children of the county, the City Club of Portland has
studied and supported Library levies on four separate occasions
(1976, 1984, 1986 (as part of an extensive study of the Library), and
1987). The following resolution includes a summary of the reports
of these studies updated to current conditions.
WHEREAS, the Board of County Commissioners for Multnomah
County passed Resolution No. 02-022, referring A Five-year Rate
Based Local Option Levy to Continue Library Services (Measure 2632) to the May 21, 2002 ballot;
WHEREAS, the unpredictable negative impact of property tax
relief legislation has impelled the County to replace the final year
of the 1997 library levy (59.97 cents per $ 1000 assessed value) with
this proposed levy to avoid a significant cut in library services in
2002;
WHEREAS, Measure 26-32 seeks to maintain the current level of
Library service through 2007;
WHEREAS, Measure 26-32 will levy $77.5 cents per $1000 of
assessed value, to produce an estimated $139.5 million over five
years, averaging $27.9 million per year, and costing the average
homeowner $95.00 per year, or $8.00 per month (based on the
average assessed value of all homes in Multnomah County);
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WHEREAS, Measure 26-32 adds $20.00 to the yearly tax bill of the
average County homeowner compared to the current Library levy;
WHEREAS, the Library is critically dependent on levy money—more
than half of its budget comes from this source;
WHEREAS, the Library provides educational and cultural resources
to the majority of County residents; and 77 percent of adults and
children in Multnomah County hold Library cards;
WHEREAS, Library users check out an average of 21 items each
year—a relatively high rate compared to the ten library systems of
comparable size in the country;
WHEREAS, Library materials are checked out an average of seven
times each year—the highest rate of use among the ten comparable
library systems;
WHEREAS, the Library is the major provider of computer and digital
information resources to roughly half of the county residents who do
not own a computer;
WHEREAS, the Library is a major provider of information needed for
the formation and maintenance of businesses and for career
planning;
WHEREAS, the total County Library support including this measure
will amount to about four percent of the total county budget; and
WHEREAS, although, City Club taxation studies have found that the
property tax is undesirably regressive and properties are now
inequitably assessed because of 1997 Measure 50, fundamental tax
reform is not being considered at this time, and no realistic
alternative exists to raise needed revenue for Library services;
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED given the ongoing need to maintain
library services that well serve our community, and following City
Club's support of past levies to meet those needs, that the City Club
Board of Governors publicly expresses the City Club's support for
Measure 26-32 on the May 21, 2002 ballot.

